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The Practice/Theory Dilemma: Personal





As a law professor and practicing lawyer, I try to work on cases that
are consistent with my feminist perspective in two ways. First, I try to
choose cases that address issues fundamental to the subordination of wo-
men. Second, I try to utilize legal theories in ways that are consistent
with feminist jurisprudence. In other words, I evaluate both the substan-
tive issue and the theoretical approach that I will be utilizing to deter-
mine my willingness to work on a case. Both these inquiries serve an
overarching commitment to make my practice consistent with my femi-
nist theory.
Nevertheless, during the course of litigation, it is easy to lose sight of
one or both of these elements. Factors that can lead to compromise in-
clude: the limitations of the judicial process through various technical
requirements such as form and page limitations; the need to work with
co-counsel who may have different theoretical or practical agendas; and
the ways in which the facts of a case or the clients' needs may not fit my
political or legal agenda.
These factors are often in the back of my mind as I work on cases,
but never before have I systematically tried to consider them during and
after working on a case. In response to an invitation from the Hastings
Law Journal to participate in this conference and theme issue on the
"Theoretics of Practice," I decided to consider these issues while writing
an amicus brief for the Fifth Circuit in the Louisiana abortion case, So-
journer T v. Roemer.' I knew that I would not be able to attend the
* Professor of Law, Tulane University. A.B. 1978, Harvard University; J.D. 1981,
Harvard Law School.
1. No. 91-3677 (5th Cir. filed Aug. 8, 1991). The amicus brief is reprinted following this
Essay as appendix A. Brief Amicus Cutiae of Black Women for Choice; The Community
Relations Committee, Jewish Federation of Greater New Orleans; Louisiana Choice; Louisi-
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conference because it was to be held in the last month of my pregnancy.
Nonetheless, I hoped to interact with the conference participants by writ-
ing an essay on the practice/theory dilemma.
Initially, my intention was to keep a journal while writing the brief
in order to document the issues I faced. Not surprisingly, my practical
difficulties (getting the brief written on time and coping with the exhaus-
tion caused by my pregnancy)2 overrode my theoretical ambitions.
Given the choice between writing one more draft of the brief and making
an entry in a journal, I opted for the draft-one of my easier practice/
theory dilemmas. Consequently, I have had to reconstruct my brief-writ-
ing experience in this Essay from memos and notes produced during the
appellate process.
My reasons for wanting to publish my reflections on the practice/
theory dilemma are twofold. First, I recently published an essay in the
Harvard Women's Law Journal in which I criticized feminists for not
writing sufficiently feminist amicus briefs in abortion cases.3 I made two
ana National Organization for Women; Louisiana Psychiatric Association; The National
Council of Jewish Women, Greater New Orleans Chapter; The New Jersey Women Lawyers
Association; and the Women of Color Reproductive Health Forum in Support of Appellees,
Sojourner T. v. Roemer, No. 91-3677 (5th Cir. fied Aug. 8, 1991) (amicus brief filed Oct. 21,
1991) [hereinafter Sojourner T amicus brief].
2. During the course of my pregnancy, I have written three pro-choice briefs in an effort
to protect every woman's right to choose whether to carry a pregnancy to term. Being preg-
nant made me more committed than ever to helping other women avoid being coerced into
pregnancy. It also made me so tired that I often found it difficult to continue with my legal
practice. Despite my feminism, I felt guilty putting my own physical needs above my practice.
I recently confided in a female colleague that I was frustrated that people at work had
expected me to work so hard during my pregnancy. She said in response, "Did you ever try
telling them that you are tired? You always walk around telling people how good you feel and
then you are surprised when they don't empathize with your exhaustion!" Ironically, I also
felt somewhat selfish in deciding to have a child, because that choice meant taking time away
from my political work. Another female colleague confided in me that she felt embarrassed to
tell people she was pregnant with her third child, because she thought they would consider her
insufficiently committed to her work. (Of course, many men on our faculty have had several
children, and no one thought they were less committed to their work.)
These comments have helped me to better recognize the subtle pressures on professional
women to be superwomen and never say "no" to additional assignments. It is therefore not
surprising that my pregnancy was one of the more productive periods of my life-a resolution
of the practice/theory dilemma of which I am not proud because it puts pressure on other
pregnant women to overachieve during their pregnancies. So long as women are a minority
within the legal profession, it will be difficult to escape work pressures like those I experienced
during my pregnancy.
3. See Ruth Colker, Feminist Litigation: An Oxymoron?-A Study of the Briefs Filed in
William L. Webster v. Reproductive Health Services, 13 HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 137 (1990)
[hereinafter Colker, Feminist Litigation]; Ruth Colker, Reply to Sarah Burns, 13 HARV. Wo-
MEN'S L.J. 207 (1990) [hereinafter Colker, Reply]. See also Ruth Colker, An Equal Protection
Analysis of United States Reproductive Health Policy: Gender, Race, Age, and Class, 1991
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central arguments in that essay: that feminists could be more "dialogic"
in writing briefs by not dismissing the importance of the state's purported
interest in valuing life in all of its various forms (including prenatal life);
and that feminists should focus on equality arguments rather than pri-
vacy arguments in writing briefs on abortion-related issues. I was
soundly criticized by two practitioners for my naivet6 in calling for more
dialogic briefs and for not understanding the doctrinal futility of making
equality arguments. 4 These criticisms made me wonder whether my es-
say on feminist litigation was located in an academic ivory tower, rather
than being truly applicable to the real world of feminist litigation. Hav-
ing never written a brief in an abortion case, I decided to see whether my
theoretical ideas about a truly "feminist" brief would be applicable in a
real case. Moreover, writing about my practice/theory dilemmas would
provide an opportunity to reflect on the relative success of my theoretical
perspective in practice.
Second, I was very excited about the amicus brief and wanted the
chance to share it with a national audience. This theme issue gives me
that opportunity. Sharing the brief with others is motivated by two
desires: the desire to influence future briefs on the abortion issue, and the
desire to expose people to the equality arguments available to challenge
an abortion statute. Because writing the brief was, for me, a political
project, I have tried to take advantage of whatever opportunities were
available to inform others of its contents-through speaking engage-
ments, op-ed pieces, and now this Essay.
Despite my desire to influence other brief writers, I realize my brief
is both limited and enhanced by its status as an amicus rather than a
chief brief. Unlike a party's chief brief, an amicus brief provides the au-
thor with an opportunity to be at once creative and political. A chief
brief has many mandatory elements, such as the statement of facts, fram-
ing of the issues, and technical statutory arguments. The lawyer who
writes a chief brief has enormous responsibilities to her client. Irrespec-
tive of her politics or dislike of a particular legal argument, she is obli-
gated to make whatever argument will give her client the best chance of
winning. An amicus brief, particularly an appellate amicus brief, has few
such constraints.
DUKE L.J. 324 [hereinafter Colker, An Equal Protection Analysis] (developing equality per-
spective to challenge United States reproductive health policies).
4. See Sarah E. Burns, Notes from the Field: A Reply to Professor Colker, 13 HARV.
WOMEN'S L.J. 189 (1990); Naomi R. Cahn, Defining Feminist Litigation, 14 HARV. WOMEN'S
L.J. 1 (1991).
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An amicus brief serves as an opportunity to develop creative alterna-
tive arguments that would not fit neatly into a chief brief, although they
might be compatible with such a brief. For example, it has become a
routine practice for the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) to raise
the equality issue in its complaint in an abortion case but not to develop
that theory in any of its briefs in the case, because privacy theory stands a
better chance of prevailing. By writing an amicus brief that raises the
equality issue, I hoped to alert the court to the fact that a plaintiff need
not lose should the right to choose abortion no longer receive heightened
protection under privacy doctrine. Raising the issue in an amicus brief
may slow down an appellate court that is willing to conclude that Roe v.
Wade5 has already been modified. Alternatively, it sets the stage for de-
veloping the equality issue on remand, should Roe be overturned. Be-
cause amicus briefs are limited to twenty pages, it was not possible to
develop the equality argument fully in Sojourner T At most, then, the
amicus brief raised the issue, so that it can be more fully developed at a
later date. In writing amicus briefs on the abortion issue,6 I have bene-
fited from reading equality briefs written by other practitioners; I hope
that others will benefit similarly from my briefs.
Planning and Community Orga 0g
My Theoretical Standpoint
My theory and practice have recently led me to focus on the abor-
tion issue. This choice requires no explanation to a feminist audience,
but it is especially appropriate for me because I live in Louisiana. Louisi-
ana has consistently led the anti-abortion movement by enacting laws
criminalizing nearly all abortions and providing for lengthy prison terms.
The Louisiana legislature's nearly absolute ban on abortion 7 is a
striking example of complete disregard for women's lives and well-being
in the name of "protecting" life. The statute contains several key ele-
ments which, in my view, make it the harshest in the country. First, the
preamble expressly states that the state's interest is, "to the greatest ex-
tent possible, . .. to protect the life of the unborn from the time of con-
5. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
6. Since writing the amicus brief in the Louisiana case, I have written an amicus brief on
the Mississippi abortion case pending in the Fifth Circuit. Brief Amicus Curiae of The Na-
tional Black Women's Health Project; Center for Constitutional Rights; Mississippi Voting
Rights Project; Mississippi National Organization for Women; National Organization for Wo-
men, Central Mississippi Chapter; Mississippi Human Services Agenda; Women's Project; and
Certain Mississippi Clergy in Support of Appellees, Barnes v. Moore, No. 91-1953 (5th Cir.
filed Sept. 3, 1991) (amicus brief filed Feb. 19, 1992) [hereinafter Barnes amicus brief].
7. 1991 La. Acts 26 (codified at LA. Rnv. STAT. ANN. § 14:87 (West Supp. 1992)).
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ception until birth."'8 Second, although the statute does not subject a
woman who has an abortion to punishment, it prohibits the termination
of pregnancy with the following exceptions: (a) the abortion is per-
formed "for the express purpose of saving the life of the mother"; (b) the
surgical termination of pregnancy is performed "to preserve the life or
health of the unborn child or to remove a dead unborn child" from the
pregnant woman; or (c) the abortion is performed upon a victim of rape
or incest, where that victim has complied with numerous reporting re-
quirements within one week of the alleged rape or incest.9 Thus, a wo-
man has to be on the verge of death in order to procure an abortion.
Further, the statute defines conception as the "contact of
spermatozoan with the ovum" but does not define pregnancy.10 Because
it purports to prohibit all devices that would terminate a pregnancy from
the moment of conception, the statute's sloppy language also suggests
that many forms of birth control, such as a low dose birth control pill or
IUD, would be prohibited. No other state has enacted a statute with so
narrow a health exception and without explicit recognition that birth
control remains lawful.
When the Louisiana legislature enacted its abortion statute, during
the summer of 1991, I immediately offered my assistance to the local
ACLU affiliate. My services were not needed at the trial court level;1 a
federal judge quickly granted the plaintiff's request for an injunction 12
and the State appealed to the Fifth Circuit. After the trial court decision
was rendered, I called the ACLU and suggested writing an amicus brief
focusing on the impact this statute would have on disadvantaged women
in the state. Moreover, I offered to write the brief from an equality
rather than a privacy perspective.
As I have written in previous articles, abortion statutes dispropor-
tionately affect the most disadvantaged women in our society, particu-
larly adolescent females, poor women, minority women, and women with
handicaps.1 3 From an equality perspective, disadvantaged women can-
8. 1991 La. Acts 26, § 1 (preamble).
9. LA. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 14:87(A)-(B) (West Supp. 1992).
10. Id. § 14:87(D)(4).
11. This was the first time that I had offered assistance to the ACLU and had my offer
turned down. Previously, the ACLU had contacted me whenever an abortion case was pend-
ing in Louisiana. I do not know why my offer was rejected; perhaps my offer never reached the
appropriate person. I would, however, have participated in this case at the trial court level had
my offer been accepted. I did not deliberately wait to enter the case until the appellate level.
12. Sojourner T. v. Roemer, 772 F. Supp. 930, 931 (E.D. La. 1991).
13. See, e.g., Colker, An Equal Protection Analysis, supra note 3 (discussing an equal
protection challenge to United States reproductive health law and policy and focusing on ado-
lescent females).
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not afford to be let alone in their reproductive lives-they need the state
to fund abortions under Medicaid; they need public hospitals to provide
abortion services along with other reproductive services; and they need
the state not to impose barriers such as waiting periods, mandatory hos-
pitalization, and physician-monitored informed consent. Our abortion
doctrine under Roe is erroneously premised on a white, adult, able-bod-
ied, middle-class woman who can afford to purchase reproductive serv-
ices, including abortion. Focusing on disadvantaged women and equality
arguments will shift the core of our abortion doctrine from privileged
women to disadvantaged women. Placing the lives of disadvantaged wo-
men on the pages of briefs filed in court is the first step in this process.
That was my intention in Sojourner T 1
4
At the outset, I faced many challenges in combining theory with
practice. First, I knew the ACLU favored a privacy approach and might
not approve of an equality approach. As the author of a brief in support
of the plaintiff-appellees, I felt an obligation not to undercut their posi-
tion. However, I also believed I was entitled to present alternative theo-
ries to the court. The ACLU's exclusive focus on the privacy approach
may not be the best way to further its clients' interests, because such a
focus inhibits the development of alternative approaches such as equality.
Thus, although I wanted to be supportive of the ACLU, I was not about
to sacrifice my own political and theoretical integrity.
Second, an amicus brief is filed on behalf of organizations, not an
individual. While fully believing that disadvantaged women within my
community would benefit from the articulation of an equality approach,
I also realized they were unlikely to understand the difference between an
equality and a privacy approach. They might understand that they were
being represented in the appellate process, but, as lay people, they might
not care about or share my own theoretical choices.
A question I therefore had to resolve was how much effort to put
into explaining to community groups the significance of choosing an
equality, rather than a privacy, perspective. Arguably, I acted unethi-
cally at this point by putting little effort into this part of the project.
Although every group that signed the brief saw at least the summary of
argument, I did not discuss with most of them the significance of the
choice of doctrine.
I rationalized this decision by noting that representation in an ami-
cus brief is not the same kind of representation as in a chief brief. The
14. That is also my intention in my forthcoming book, RUTH COLKER, ABORTION &
DIALOGUE: PRO-CHOICE, PRO-LIFE, AND AMERICAN LAW (forthcoming 1992).
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chief brief in Sojourner T. already contained a privacy argument and
purported to represent all women in the state. My brief simply supple-
mented the chief brief. In addition, my clients had not sought special
representation and would not have participated had I not volunteered to
write an equality-based amicus brief. In a sense, they were doing me a
favor by lending their names in support of my efforts, rather than the
reverse. (Had they approached me with a specific agenda and asked me
to write a brief on their behalf, my obligations would have been differ-
ent.) Most importantly, I truly believed that my arguments-focusing
on the statute's impact on the most disadvantaged women in the state-
would prove beneficial to my clients. Absent that belief, I would not
have written the amicus brief. Finally, had there been time to discuss my
theoretical framework, we probably would have agreed on the central
issues raised by the brief.
Throughout my work on the case, I faced an ongoing dilemma
about how much work I could do while pregnant. (I had become preg-
nant in May, and the baby was due in mid-February.) Having exper-
ienced two miscarriages in the previous year, I did not want to
experience a third. Also, until October I was extremely nauseous and did
not know, from day to day, how much time I could devote to the brief.
Therefore, I had to be extremely well organized, for the brief had to be
on time; I could not afford to get behind. These pregnancy-induced time
pressures influenced my judgment on a number of decisions, such as how
much time to spend discussing the project with the parties I was
representing.
The deadline for the brief was Monday, October 21st, but I told
myself, and others working with me, that the deadline was October 18th,
to leave room for error in the event of illness or exhaustion.15
Finding Clients
I needed clients to represent and, at the outset, extended an invita-
tion to my colleague, Wendy Brown, to assist me on the brief, and, spe-
cifically, in finding clients. Wendy had had experience with client
networking in her earlier work on an amicus brief in the Webster case. 
16
15. In fact, I did get sick on October 19th, so it was fortunate that the brief was at the
printer by the 18th.
16. See Brief Amicus Curiae of The National Council of Negro Women, Inc.; National
Urban League, Inc.; The American Indian Health Care Association; The Asian American
Legal Defense Fund; Committee for Hispanic Children and Families; The Mexican American
Legal Defense Fund and Education Fund; National Black Women's Health Project; National
Institute for Women of Color; National Women's Health Network; Organizaci6n Nacional de
la Salud de la Mujer Latina; Organization of Asian Women; Puerto Rican Legal Defense and
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Wendy also is very active in the African-American community in New
Orleans, so I thought she would be able to network quite effectively in
our home community. In late August I also began to call people at the
ACLU and Planned Parenthood for suggestions regarding potential cli-
ents. Louisiana Planned Parenthood initially indicated they were inter-
ested in participating, and they seemed like ideal clients because they had
an office in the St. Thomas Housing Project. 17 After speaking with my
contacts, I made up a tentative list of community groups to contact, but
soon ran into problems getting agreement from these groups to
participate.
For instance, I attempted to obtain the signature of the Louisiana
Psychiatric Association's Committee on Women, but was informed that
the entire Association would have to sign on. This threatened to under-
mine my plan to describe all participating groups as "women's groups."'18
Obviously, that would be impossible if the entire Association signed on.
Moreover, the Association did not fit the desired profile of groups that
represented disadvantaged women. But I did not have a long list of po-
tential clients, and, because they understood the purpose behind my
brief, I felt their participation would be genuine. In addition, the entire
Association's support would look good because their mainstream and
respected role within the larger community would add credibility to my
description of the harm the anti-abortion statute would work on women's
lives. Finally, the Association was the only group that approached me
on its own initiative. As one of a public interest lawyer's top priorities
should be to represent groups that desire representation, I felt a responsi-
bility to accommodate them. The Psychiatric Association's participa-
tion, however, forced me to make an initial compromise-to forgo
representing women's groups alone. That compromise was acceptable
because it did not require any change in the theoretical focus of the brief.
The only change it necessitated was in how I described the groups in my
motion requesting permission to file an amicus brief. On the positive
side, the Association's participation allowed me to highlight women with
Education Fund; Women of Color Partnership Program of the Religious Coalition for Abor-
tion Rights; Women of All Red Nations, North Dakota; YWCA of the U.S.A.; and Other
Organizations in Support of Appellees, Webster v. Reproductive Health Services, 492 U.S. 490
(1989).
17. The St. Thomas Housing Project is a public housing unit in one of the poorest neigh-
borhoods in New Orleans.
18. Because my project was to write an equality brief on behalf of women, which focused
on the facts of disadvantaged women's lives, I wanted the groups that I represented to be able
to speak directly to those facts. As a privileged group of medical professionals, most of whom
are men, the entire Association did not fit my original profile.
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handicaps, including women with mental illness, and its medical exper-
tise served to improve those arguments.
Another problematic group was Women for Women with AIDS.
Although their director was enthusiastic about the brief, she informed
me that the organization could only participate if a consensus to do so
were reached among all the group's clients. Not surprisingly, that
proved to be impossible within the available time. This left me with no
AIDS-oriented group for whom I could claim to speak. 19 Nevertheless,
my request appears to have served a useful political purpose in forcing
the organization to discuss its position and achieve a consensus among its
members on the Louisiana abortion statute.
Because I wanted to focus on the AIDS issue,20 I needed an AIDS
organization to participate and therefore contacted the New Orleans
AIDS (NO/AIDS) Task Force. Though their Board agreed to partici-
pate, their lawyer drafted their statement of interest in a way that
threatened to undermine much of the brief and therefore was unaccept-
able. He insisted on concluding their statement of interest with a para-
graph emphasizing that the Task Force joined the brief only to the extent
it discussed the problems of women with AIDS. The paragraph read:
As an agency that deals on a daily basis with the needs of HIV-infected
individuals, many of whom are women, the NO/AIDS Task Force
joins in this amicus curiae brief as it relates to the health of those wo-
men who are either HIV positive or have been diagnosed with AIDS
which is addressed in Section I(B)(2) regarding women with handi-
caps. To that extent, the NO/AIDS Task Force supports this amicus
curiae brief.
21
I consulted Wendy Brown and another colleague, both of whom agreed
that this disclaimer was unacceptable because it undercut our other cli-
ents. The disclaimer suggested that they joined the brief only insofar as
it addressed problems pertaining particularly to women with AIDS, and
not to the extent that it discussed other groups of disadvantaged women.
This kind of problem can arise when a lawyer attempts to represent mul-
tiple clients with divergent interests and is not unique to brief writing. It
19. After the brief was filed, their director informed me that the group had decided to
participate. But, of course, by then it was too late to include them.
20. Pregnancy depresses cell-mediated immunity, thereby causing more rapid progres-
sion of HIV infection. It also greatly increases the risk of complications from pregnancy.
Sojourner T amicus brief, supra note 1, at 9, reprinted in app. A infra. Because the Louisiana
legislature was made aware of these medical facts but chose to reject an amendment providing
an exception for women with HIV infection, id. at 12, I had a strong argument that the legisla-
ture, in enacting the statute, knowingly shortened the lives of pregnant women with HIV
infection.
21. Facsimile of Statement of Interest, NO/AIDS Task Force, Sojourner T. v. Roemer,
No. 91-3677 (5th Cir. filed Aug. 8, 1991) (October 17, 1991) (draft on file with author).
April 1992] THE LOUISIANA ABORTION CASE
is an unavoidable aspect of coalition politics-finding ways to bring
groups together, to combat the larger community's tendency to pit us
against each other. My instinct, and that of my colleagues, was to re-
quire that any group joining the brief join it in its entirety. We did not
want our efforts to fuel any strife between our clients. Therefore, we
adhered to the policy that a group join the entire brief or forgo participa-
tion in the coalition.
Prior to this point in the process, I had not focused on the special
needs of individual client groups. I had been trying to persuade groups
to endorse my political agenda, rather than considering how the interests
of one group might undercut those of another group. The NO/AIDS
Task Force's response to my efforts reminded me of my ethical responsi-
bility to attend to the needs of my clients.
After clarifying my position through discussions with others, I dis-
cussed the statement of interest with the Executive Director of the Task
Force, explaining that we could not accept the group's participation un-
less the last paragraph was omitted. After brief negotiations, during
which he offered to delete the last sentence but not the last paragraph, we
agreed the Task Force should not participate. I followed up this discus-
sion with a letter. The letter criticized the Task Force strongly for refus-
ing to work with their lesbian and straight sisters who have been so
central to the AIDS movement, and for allowing fundraising considera-
tions to narrow the organization's focus. I have included the full text of
my letter to the Executive Director of the NO/AIDS Task Force in an
appendix so the reader can see how I responded to this problem within
my community.
22
Because I see writing an appellate amicus brief as a political task, I
think it is important that community-based groups be asked to consider
their position on the issues raised by the brief. My brief prompted the
NO/AIDS Task Force to discuss its position on abortion. In addition, it
provided me with an opportunity to respond to that position from the
standpoint of one who is very politically active on both the AIDS and
abortion issues. Although discussion within the NO-AIDS Task Force
did not result in a strong pro-choice position, discussion within Women
for Women with AIDS ultimately did result in a strong pro-choice posi-
tion. Thus, I think it can fairly be said that our brief helped create an
important and productive dialogue regarding abortion within the AIDS
activist community, even though neither of these groups participated in
the brief itself.
22. The text of the letter is reprinted following this Essay as appendix B.
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Another community group with which I had difficulty was the Na-
tional Council for Negro Women of Greater New Orleans. I contacted
them because the national organization had a pro-choice position and
had joined Wendy's brief in the Webster case. We were warned that, in
the past, the local branch had been reluctant to join pro-choice efforts.
But we also heard that their reluctance might have been because of time
constraints rather than philosophical problems. When I sent the director
of the organization a description of the brief, she informed me that her
board would be meeting soon and would respond in a week or so. I never
heard from her again, despite leaving two telephone messages. Eventu-
ally Wendy informed me that the Council had voted not to participate.
Although we were never offered any explanation for their refusal, the
large number of Catholics in the New Orleans organization leads me to
believe they were unable to reach a consensus on the abortion issue.
Planned Parenthood of Louisiana also turned out to have problems
joining the brief. Their attorney decided to file a brief on the organiza-
tion's behalf in the Fifth Circuit to argue an abstention issue that related
to their pending state court case.23 Although they were philosophically
behind our efforts, they felt they could not sign two entirely unrelated
briefs in the same Fifth Circuit appeal.
24
The final group we contacted was an African-American sorority-
Delta Sigma Theta. Wendy had a contact with that group and thought
she could get them to participate. Unfortunately, her contact had gradu-
ated and she was unable to obtain their consent to be named on the brief.
Thus, as of approximately two weeks before the brief was due, only
two community groups had agreed to participate: the Women of Color
Reproductive Health Forum, and the Louisiana Psychiatric Association.
23. The strategy with regard to the Louisiana statute was to pursue two parallel law-
suits-a state suit arguing that the statute violated the state constitution, and a federal suit.
Planned Parenthood had primary responsibility for the state suit and the ACLU had primary
responsibility for the federal suit. A decision was rendered first in the federal suit enjoining the
enforcement of the statute, thus putting the federal suit on a faster track than the state suit.
See Sojourner T. v. Roemer, 772 F. Supp. 930 (E.D. La. 1991). The state suit has been stayed
pending the outcome of the federal suit. See Planned Parenthood v. Louisiana, Civ. No.
370,917 (La. Dist. Ct. Aug. 14, 1991) (order granting plaintiff's motion to stay). The state
court judge indicated, however, that he would enjoin enforcement of the Louisiana statute
under state law if Roe v. Wade were overturned by the federal courts and the federal injunction
were lifted. Id.
24. A few months later, however, Planned Parenthood did ask me to write an amicus
brief in the Fifth Circuit representing disadvantaged women with regard to the Mississippi
abortion statute. See Barnes v. Moore, No. 91-1953 (5th Cir. filed Sept. 3, 1991). I agreed to
write the brief from an equality perspective and they fully supported my efforts. It seems clear,
then, that Planned Parenthood's inability to participate in my Louisiana brief was due to logis-
tic rather than substantive inconsistencies.
April 1992]
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Desperate for more clients, I called the national ACLU and Wendy. I
then contacted Leslie Gerwin, a local attorney and former Tulane Law
School professor, who heads pro-choice lobbying efforts in Baton Rouge.
Leslie offered us a list of local pro-choice groups, along with telephone
contacts. She also sent a mailing on our behalf, which Wendy and I
followed up with telephone calls. Unfortunately, many of the groups
probably never received the mailing because of errors in their mailing
addresses. Our list contained contact people rather than offices for most
of the groups; if the contact person became inactive, the mail seemed to
get lost. Thus, when Wendy and I made our telephone calls, we usually
found ourselves speaking with someone who knew little or nothing about
our efforts.
Ultimately, a wide variety of organizations did join the brief-Black
Women for Choice; the Community Relations Committee, Jewish Feder-
ation of Greater New Orleans; Louisiana Choice, New Orleans Chapter;
the Louisiana Psychiatric Association; Louisiana National Organization
for Women; the New Jersey Women Lawyers Association; and the Wo-
men of Color Reproductive Health Forum. But the final list of partici-
pants was more a result of happenstance than deliberate action on our
part. The Jewish organizations joined the coalition because Leslie
Gerwin had contacts with them, even though they probably would have
preferred a brief focusing on the religion issue.25 The New Jersey Wo-
men Lawyers Association joined the brief to express their objection to
their bar association's decision to hold a meeting in New Orleans. Ap-
proximately half the client groups were local organizations representing
disadvantaged women and therefore fitting my original profile for the
brief.
In retrospect, I see my difficulty in "signing on" groups that fit my
original profile as a not unusual problem, at least in the South. For ex-
ample, Planned Parenthood recently asked me to author a brief in the
Fifth Circuit on the Mississippi abortion case, Barnes v. Moore,26 focus-
ing on the impact of the statute on disadvantaged women. They assured
me they already had groups desiring representation and simply needed
an author for the brief. I was therefore able to focus all my efforts on
writing the brief on the assumption that client groups had already been
selected. In fact, Planned Parenthood experienced many of the same
problems finding clients that I had encountered in Louisiana. They even-
25. Leslie Gerwin told me that the Jewish organizations would have preferred a brief that
made the argument that the state cannot establish a particular religious viewpoint by criminal-
izing abortion.
26. See supra note 24.
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tually developed a list of client organizations but were disappointed at
how few of the ultimate list proved to be local organizations directly rep-
resenting disadvantaged women.
The difficulties I experienced in organizing groups to participate in
the amicus process may be reflective of the larger problem of organizing
groups in conservative communities to oppose anti-abortion efforts. If
the women of Louisiana were more politically organized, one might ex-
pect that the state legislature would not be able to enact the harshest
anti-abortion statute in the United States. But the problem is not merely
one of political disorganization. Women in the South, on average, simply
are not as pro-choice as women in the Northeast, where the national pro-
choice groups are based.2 7 Thus, women involved in the New Orleans
chapters of groups such as the National Council for Negro Women will
not necessarily share the pro-choice perspective of their counterparts in
the New York chapter of the same organizations.
From the outset I understood that it might be difficult to get wo-
men's organizations in Louisiana to support my brief. For this reason, I
chose to write a moderate, or narrow, brief that focused exclusively on
the extreme harshness of the Louisiana statute and did not make asser-
tions about other states' statutes. I also made this choice clear to my
potential clients and, in some cases, it may have helped win their sup-
port. No matter how moderate the brief, however, I could not persuade
all the groups we contacted to participate because the brief was, at root, a
pro-choice brief on the abortion issue.
Finally, I learned the not surprising fact that, had I given potential
client groups more time to come to a decision, more of them would have
joined the brief. However, because I was determined to meet the artifi-
cial October 18th deadline, I turned down the late offers. Had I been
willing to wait until the last minute to fie, I could have enlisted the sup-
port of at least three more national, African-American organizations. I
felt guilty for placing fear about my own health over persuading more
organizations to join our efforts, but I asked Wendy to communicate to
these organizations that we would welcome their participation at the
Supreme Court level.
27. I have no empirical support for this statement; however, it is interesting to note that
in the recent Louisiana statewide election, not one candidate ran on a pro-choice platform.




Student assistance in this project seemed especially appropriate for
two reasons. First, it would make the task of writing the brief easier,
especially the performance of research at the medical school library. Sec-
ond, student involvement would help to politicize the Tulane Law School
community with respect to abortion. Although most students at Tulane
seem to be pro-choice, there has been no groundswell of student activism
on the abortion issue. I hoped my leadership on the issue would inspire
them to become more politically involved.
Fortunately, there were a number of sources of potential student
assistance. Tulane Law School has a community service requirement for
its students. They must complete twenty hours of community service in
order to graduate. It also has a women's law association. Although the
women's law association has typically not been particularly politically
active, in the last couple of years it has sponsored public lectures on re-
productive health issues. I also was teaching a large family law class that
focused on feminist as well as reproductive issues. Since I wanted to get
help on the brief in the way most likely to mobilize my home community,
I turned to the community service program for assistance and publicized
my efforts to the women's law association and my family law class.
Nonetheless, the utility of student assistance was uncertain. One lo-
gistical difficulty was organizing a large number of students and keeping
them busy. In addition, I would not select the students; they would se-
lect the project. Thus, there was no way to insure the quality of their
work. Delegation could easily weaken the quality of the research. Dean
Kramer said he would try to provide some supervisory help, but that
assistance never materialized. Thirty students quickly signed up to work
on the brief and I had to set ground rules immediately to limit and con-
trol student participation.
First, I took steps to limit the number of students involved with the
project. I required all students interested in participating to attend a
meeting on September 13th, and refused to take any volunteers after that
date. I also required all student work to be turned in by September 23rd,
so that I would have a chance to review it before writing the brief (and to
allow for late submissions). Second, I assigned two students to each pro-
ject in order to be reasonably assured of adequate work quality. Because
I knew most of the students who volunteered, I was able to assign some
of the more difficult assignments to the best students. I also told the stu-
dents to provide me with a photocopy of any source upon which they
relied so that I could double-check their research. Not surprisingly, the
student work varied enormously in its quality. I had students, for exam-
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pie, provide me with cases that were not "shephardized." Had I not
checked their research, I could have greatly embarrassed myself. Other
students, however, provided extensive medical research that proved to be
very useful. The most pleasant surprise was the students' timeliness. Ac-
customed as I am to students handing in assignments late, it was pleasing
to see them take this deadline seriously.
It is hard to gauge how successful student involvement was on a
political level. The students did seem to take a strong interest in the case.
I continually run out of copies of the brief and students often come by
my office to express their appreciation for the opportunity to work on it.
Most of the student-volunteers attended a moot court exercise I organ-
ized on the case. Many of them also attended the oral argument in the
Fifth Circuit. Thus, involving students does seem to have helped arouse
in them a keen interest in the case. When I later initiated a similar pro-
ject on the Mississippi abortion case, many of the same students again
volunteered to assist, even if they had already completed their mandatory
community service requirement. I therefore benefited personally from
their logistical assistance, while they hopefully became more politically
involved in their community.
Doctrine
I have written a great deal about the abortion issue but, until this
brief, had never practiced in this area of the law. In my academic writ-
ings, I have insisted that we should pursue an equality perspective rather
than a privacy perspective on abortion. As I have discussed elsewhere,
my reasons for preferring equality over privacy are both theoretical and
practical. 28 I have never liked the privacy approach because it is too
individualistic in nature; moreover, I prefer an equality approach because
it best describes how pregnancy-related restrictions relate to women's
overall equality in society. I believe women should have the right to
choose whether to terminate a pregnancy not because of their right to
control their bodies but because of their right to the opportunity to
achieve full and equal citizenship in society. Because we live in a society
that does virtually nothing to facilitate pregnancy, childbirth, and child
28. A group-based equality approach is more consistent with a feminist perspective on
the abortion issue for the following reasons: an equality approach, if successful, would provide
fuller protection for all women in society by reversing the abortion funding decisions; an equal-
ity approach best indicates our valuation of fetal life as well as a woman's right to terminate a
pregnancy; and an equality approach is more communitarian rather than individualistic. For
further discussion, see Colker, Feminist Litigation, supra note 3; Colker, Reply, supra note 3, at
207 n.3.
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care, and, instead, imposes all of these burdens on women, I believe it is
essential that women be free to choose pregnancy, rather than be coerced
into maintaining an unwanted pregnancy. The burdens placed on wo-
men's reproductive capacity by society are, in my view, fundamental to
women's inequality in society. Thus, I have tried to develop an equality
perspective in my academic writing to explain why abortion-related re-
strictions violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment.
Doctrinally, it is difficult to be successful under an equality perspec-
tive. The Supreme Court's decisions in Geduldig v. AieIo 29 and Person-
nel Administrator v. Feeney30 are two major stumbling blocks. In
Geduldig, the Court held that pregnancy-related restrictions are not per
se gender-based restrictions, which would have entitled the petitioner to
heightened scrutiny. Many feminists have challenged the Geduldig deci-
sion, arguing that it is absurd not to view pregnancy as a sex-based classi-
fication.31 In Feeney, the Court held that a petitioner can obtain
heightened scrutiny through evidence of a gender-based impact (as op-
posed to a gender-based classification) only if she can also demonstrate
that the legislature enacted the legislation because of rather than despite
its impact on women. Few cases have even been attempted and virtually
none have been successful under this stringent requirement.
Although I agree that Geduldig was wrongly decided and ought not
to preclude an anti-abortion statute from receiving heightened scrutiny, I
chose not to challenge Geduldig in the Louisiana case.32 Instead, I chose
the more difficult task of meeting the impact-intent standard set forth in
Feeney.
Theoretical and practical reasons led to that decision. On a theoret-
ical level, I believe feminists have focused too exclusively on Geduldig
without pursuing the possibilities of a Feeney approach. By using the
Feeney standard, I hoped to turn its doctrinal problems into an advan-
tage. On a more basic level, the Feeney standard is problematic because
it requires the plaintiff to prove the legislature intended the statute's dis-
29. 417 U.S. 484 (1974).
30. 442 U.S. 256 (1979).
31. See generally Sylvia A. Law, Rethinking Sex and the Constitution, 132 U. PA. L.
REv. 955, 983 (1984) (describing the numerous criticisms of Geduldig as a "cottage industry").
32. Nevertheless, I did recently challenge the applicability of Geduldig to an abortion-
related restriction in a brief filed in the Fifth Circuit on the Mississippi abortion statute. See
Barnes amicus brief, supra note 6. In Barnes I decided to challenge the applicability of
Geduldig rather than try to meet the impact-intent standard under Feeney because the legisla-
tive history was bare and did not provide strong evidence of intent. Practical rather than
theoretical considerations prompted that decision.
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parate impact on women. This is a very difficult standard of proof. In
the Louisiana case, however, strong evidence exists that the legislature
knowingly harmed women's well-being through enactment of the anti-
abortion statute.33 One of my primary goals was to put the evidence of
intent into the record; the Feeney burden of proof would require me to do
so. Thus, rather than try to avoid the Feeney standard by arguing the
case involved per se gender-based discrimination, I decided to use the
Feeney burden of proof directly. Although meeting the Feeney standard
is difficult, given the evidence, I welcomed the opportunity to meet that
challenge.
Another way to consider the choice between a Geduldig and a Fee-
ney approach is to think of the choice as one between a theoretical and a
pragmatic approach. In order to proceed under a per se standard of dis-
crimination, a section of the brief would have had to be devoted to distin-
guishing Geduldig, or arguing that Geduldig was wrongly decided. That
discussion would have been doctrinal and not tied to the special facts
existing in Louisiana. In contrast, under the Feeney standard I had no
choice but to put lots of facts about intent into the record. Given my
desire to focus on the facts, the pragmatic rather than the theoretical
approach was the natural choice.34
Although I wanted to write an "equality brief," I was not sure how
far that argument would reach in striking down abortion statutes else-
where. Being a resident of Louisiana and personally committed to over-
turning our abortion statute, I chose not to focus on the broader
implications of my argument for other pending cases. I felt comfortable
representing just the disadvantaged women of Louisiana; other attorneys
could represent women in other states in other cases.
I understand that other lawyers have used the amicus process to
shape the law generally rather than to focus on the case directly before
the court. I rejected that option because I felt it would disserve the wo-
men of Louisiana. Louisiana consistently has had the most onerous anti-
abortion law in the country. Louisiana's new statute will literally cause
the death of women to an extent not threatened in other states. It seems
clear to me that the Supreme Court will dramatically modify Roe v.
Wade so as to uphold nearly all anti-abortion statutes. My hope, how-
33. Sojourner T amicus brief, supra note 1, at 11-12, reprinted in app. A infra.
34. I would not make the same decision, however, in all abortion cases. As discussed
above, because such evidence of intent was not clearly present in the Mississippi case, I chose a
somewhat more abstract doctrinal approach in that case aiming to distinguish Geduldig. Nev-
ertheless, even in the Mississippi case, I set up the doctrinal framework so as to provide for
extensive factual discussion of the statute's impact on disadvantaged women.
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ever, is that even a conservative court will see that the Louisiana statute
is in a league of its own-that it fails to pass muster under any level of
scrutiny because it does not even provide an exception to protect the
pregnant woman's health unless her life is threatened. Broad theoretical
pro-choice arguments often lose sight of the range of injustices that state
legislatures have imposed on women's lives. I wanted Louisiana to be
held accountable for its record of injustice against women and to show
how Louisiana stood alone in the western world in its disrespect for wo-
men (and children). 35 A broad theoretical argument would be less likely
than a focused, pragmatic argument to achieve that result.
As I had promised, I sent a draft of the brief to the national ACLU.
Although I was not representing the ACLU, I was writing a brief in
support of their position in the case. They had assisted me by sending me
equality briefs that had been filed elsewhere. Their briefs, however,
proved not to be particularly useful in the Louisiana case because they
argued that anti-abortion statutes constitute per se gender-based discrim-
ination. As discussed above, that was not the approach I chose to take.36
Reading their briefs, however, put me on notice that they probably
would not be comfortable with my presentation of the equality position.
As expected, the ACLU representative was concerned about several
aspects of the brief. First, she was concerned that it might undercut their
arguments in similar cases involving Utah, Guam, and Pennsylvania stat-
utes. 37 She did not perceive a significant difference between a Louisiana
statute with a life exception and Utah and Guam statutes with a health
exception. Second, she objected to the brief's concession that the appro-
priate standard of review was intermediate rather than strict scrutiny.
She suggested strict scrutiny could be obtained by arguing that reproduc-
tive issues are so basic to women's equality they require strict scrutiny.
Her argument was basically additive: equality plus privacy equals strict
35. Some of the clients implicitly expressed the same point of view by asking me to write
a "moderate" brief, at least that was how I interpreted their request. To be honest, I had made
the decision to pursue this more moderate approach before any of the clients indicated their
preference for that approach. Consequently, I made no attempt to convince my clients to seek
a broader and more theoretical approach.
36. Their briefs, however, did prove useful when I tried to distinguish Geduldig in the
Mississippi case.
37. I am not comfortable publicly reporting these conversations because the ACLU de-
serves a great deal of credit for the extraordinary job it has done in preserving our reproductive
freedom on a small budget and with a very overworked staff. I fully understood why we had
our differences on this brief. Out of respect for their work, I tried to accommodate their views
as best as I could without sacrificing what I perceived to be the interests of my clients. With-
out the ACLU's work, the Louisiana legislature would have criminalized abortion more than
decade ago.
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scrutiny. Moreover, she planned to argue strict scrutiny on remand if
the court asked her to brief the equality issue, and she wanted to avoid
disagreement with our brief on that issue.
In response to the first point, I said my client was Louisiana, not
Utah or Guam. She then pointed out that I might be undercutting my
own clients by giving the court a narrow way to overturn the Louisiana
statute-leaving the legislature free to enact a statute with a health ex-
ception next year. Having decided to focus my efforts on the women of
Louisiana, rather than all the women of the United States, I was uncon-
cerned about whether my argument would be applicable to Utah or
Guam. However, I was troubled by the idea that my argument might
undercut the women of Louisiana. I therefore agreed to think further
about this problem.
At this point, I faced a serious dilemma. Was I undercutting my
clients by making too narrow an argument and by not arguing for the
highest possible level of scrutiny? I discussed this with many of my col-
leagues, some of whom had worked previously with the ACLU. They all
agreed that a narrow brief was in my clients' best interest and that na-
tional organizations have a tendency not to consider the specifics of their
particular client groups. Nonetheless, they did suggest the possibility of
arguing in the alternative about the level of scrutiny, in case the court
wanted an opportunity to apply strict scrutiny to a gender case.
Therefore, I decided to argue in the alternative regarding the appro-
priate level of scrutiny and drop clarifying footnotes to ensure that the
brief not appear to endorse the Guam or Utah statute. One problem with
this approach was that it used up valuable paragraphs, and the Fifth
Circuit's twenty page limit is strictly enforced. This meant giving up
part of my original argument. For example, I had to delete a discussion
about Spain (one of Louisiana's civil law ancestors) in order to argue in
the alternative concerning Geduldig and the standard of scrutiny.
Her second point, the additive argument for strict scrutiny, was not
very convincing. The court would only reach the equality issue if it con-
strued Roe no longer to require strict scrutiny. In addition, this additive
theory has never received much support from the Supreme Court. Nev-
ertheless, I promised to think about the issue, and ultimately added one
sentence making the additive argument, seeing no doctrinal harm in ar-
guing for strict scrutiny. I did, however, regret the loss of valuable space
through that argument.
Before filing the brief, I sent the ACLU a final draft; they had only
one technical suggestion regarding the labelling of the addendum. I as-
sumed that the ACLU was not totally pleased with the shape of my argu-
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ment. But in the end, it was my brief and not theirs. Because I value
their work in the reproductive health area, I did my best to accommodate
their views without undercutting my own and those of my clients. Since
the brief purported to "support" the position of the appellees (the
ACLU's clients), I did not think it appropriate to ignore the ACLU's
views entirely. On the other hand, because an amicus brief is not directly
on behalf of a particular party, I believe it was appropriate to differ with
the ACLU's basic approach. Indeed, one might argue that the impor-
tance of amicus briefs is to allow the development of positions not likely
to be developed in the chief briefs. I hope our brief supported the efforts
of the ACLU, while presenting a novel theory to the court.
Post-Brief Political Work
Filing the brief was a political act. I wanted to get the equality argu-
ments on the table and describe in detail what kind of an impact this
statute would have on disadvantaged women in Louisiana. But the brief
was only a starting point. The public relations department at Tulane
suggested writing an op-ed essay on the brief, and I did. They placed the
op-ed piece in the Dallas Morning News.38 In April 1992 I spoke at
Southern Methodist University (SMU) Law School in Dallas on the Lou-
isiana and Mississippi abortion cases. (Some professors on the SMU
faculty indicated that the op-ed piece had already generated some discus-
sion of these issues at SMU.) The ACLU asked me to organize a moot
court for Janet Benshoof, the ACLU lawyer who argued the Louisiana
case in the Fifth Circuit. I conducted the moot court at Tulane on the
day before the oral argument in the Fifth Circuit and invited my student-
volunteers to attend. Many of the students also attended the oral argu-
ment. They reported to me how much they enjoyed attending the moot
court and seeing the oral argument in progress.
Despite misgivings about using clients for my own political ends, I
take some consolation from the fact that the groups that ultimately par-
ticipated seemed quite excited about their participation. Many of them
called after the Fifth Circuit oral argument to find out how the case was
going. It thus seems that they, in fact, attained some sense of empower-
ment through participating in the process, even if I was using them for
purposes they may not have understood entirely.
Although adopting and developing an equality perspective created
some tension with the ACLU, I later received substantial thanks from
38. Ruth Colker, Louisiana Abortion Ban is a Very Real Threat to Women, DALLAS
MORNING NEWS, Feb. 6, 1992, at 23A.
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the ACLU for my efforts. Nadine Strossen, the President of the ACLU,
indicated that she was very interested in the development of the equality
theory. In addition, Janet Benshoof spoke about the equality perspective
in a public television program on abortion a few days before the oral
argument in the Fifth Circuit. I, in turn, gained valuable insight on the
equality theory from discussions with Benshoof, and was able to incorpo-
rate some of her ideas into my Mississippi brief. In retrospect, it seems I
may have overestimated my differences with the ACLU while working
on the brief.
Since writing the federal Louisiana brief, I have written two other
briefs in abortion cases. One was filed with the Louisiana State Supreme
Court39 and the other, the Mississippi case, was fied with the Fifth Cir-
cuit.40 In the Louisiana state case, an adolescent had sought permission
to obtain an abortion from a state court judge, as required under our
juvenile bypass statute.41 The judge had appointed an attorney to repre-
sent the fetus, and had allowed that attorney to subpoena a witness (the
alleged father of the fetus). Working with another attorney, I success-
fully challenged those requirements under Louisiana state constitutional
law.42 In this case, I was representing my client directly, rather than
through the amicus process. Despite my misgivings about privacy doc-
trine, I relied heavily on privacy doctrine in this case because Louisiana
state constitutional law tracks Roe v. Wade without modification. The
entire case was resolved successfully within four days, including an ap-
peal to the Louisiana Supreme Court. My priority was unquestionably to
help obtain an abortion for my client at the earliest possible moment; I
spent no time worrying about my theoretical perspective concerning the
choice of legal doctrine on abortion. Her immediate health and well-
being were my sole concern. This experience has helped me recognize
the opportunity offered by the appellate amicus process to develop legal
theories in a way rarely present in day-to-day direct client representation.
In addition, I have done numerous interviews and speaking engage-
ments. In its Spring 1992 issue, Tulane Law School's Alumni magazine,
The Tulane Lawyer, featured my pro-choice work in an article that I
hope will inspire some Tulane graduates to become more involved in pro-
choice efforts.43 At public speaking engagements on the subject, I have
39. In re Application of Jane Doe, 591 So. 2d 698 (La. 1991).
40. Barnes v. Moore, No. 91-1953 (5th Cir. filed Sept. 3, 1991)
41. LA. REv. STAT. AN. § 40:1299.35.5(B) (West Supp. 1992).
42. Jane Doe, 591 So. 2d 698.
43. See Ivy Jefferson, Abortion Laws in Louisiana: Fueling Fires and Setting Precedents,




had fun playing off the visibility of my pregnancy. When, for example, a
state legislator tried to describe my position as "pro-abortion," I stood
up displaying my eight months of pregnancy and said that I would not be
pregnant if I were pro-abortion rather than pro-choice. Such actions
might be considered grandstanding, but they make a point many anti-
abortion advocates would like to deny-that their opponents are pro-
choice rather than pro-abortion. Finally, I have written this Essay and
spoken at SMU and Northwestern University law schools to let others
know about the situation in Louisiana.
I do not expect to be cited in the Fifth Circuit's opinion, but I hope
my work serves to inform others of the dramatic consequences that the
Louisiana statute will have on women's lives. In this way, perhaps I can
help prevent the enactment of such onerous statutes elsewhere.
Conclusion
Writing a tight, twenty page argument that develops a theoretical
perspective while representing clients is a challenging but enjoyable task.
In the future, I would start earlier in trying to find clients and make more
effective contacts in my own community. I might also stay more in-
dependent of national organizations, so that I can more accurately assess
and represent my local constituency's needs."
In retrospect, I do not believe that I faced enormous difficulties in
combining theory and practice, perhaps because of the many compro-
mise decisions I made before beginning the project. I did not use any
novel form of argument. Because I disdain the rhetorical style of brief
writing, my voice was probably a bit less argumentative than is typical in
a brief.45 But I did not interweave women's voices or do anything else
equally unusual, as has been done in some briefs.46 I felt so constrained
by the page limitation that the only possible style of writing seemed to be
a terse style. Within the constraints that I identified at the outset, it was
44. Despite my good intentions, I was even more dependent on national counsel in the
Mississippi case, because I took no responsibility for finding clients to represent. In the Missis-
sippi case, I also compromised in terms of the substance of the brief after consulting with both
Planned Parenthood and the NAACP Legal Defense Fund. My pregnancy was also a key
factor in making this compromise. The brief was filed in the Fifth Circuit on February 19th,
and my baby was born on February 20th-I was literally heading to the hospital while my
New York co-counsel was heading to the Federal Express office with the brief. To be part of a
national pro-choice network, such compromises may be necessary.
45. See Colker, Feminist Litigation, supra note 3.
46. See e.g., Lynn M. Paltrow, Amicus Brief- Richard Thornburgh v. American College of
Obstetricians and Gynecologists, 9 WOMEN'S RTs. L. REP. 3 (1986), for an example of an
amicus brief that interweaves women's stories.
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a satisfying project. I have attached the actual brief to this Essay so that
the reader can determine for herself or himself how successful I was in
my task.
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STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE
Whether Act 26 of the 1991 Louisiana Legislature ["the
Act"], criminalizing abortion and many forms of contraception,
violates the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment to the United States Constitution by discriminating
against women?
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INTEREST OF THE AMICUS CURXE
BLACK WOMEN FOR CHOICE is a Newe Orleans based organiza-
tion founded to encourage participation by women of color in
the effort to protect the right of women to choice in all
aspects of life, especially regarding the choice to bear
children. We are particularly concerned with educating
adolescent women on reproductive issues so that they can make
informed decisions about their bodies. It is clear that such
decisions have long-lasting, and potentially adverse effects,
on future opportunities in education, employment, and other
important phases of life. This is especially true for women
of color. We agree with the other amici that the legislation
enacted by the Louisiana state legislature, which severely
curtails choice, should be struck down.
THE COMMUNITY RELATIONS COMMITTEE, JEWISH FEDERATION OF
GREATER NEW ORLEANS, is an umbrella organization representing
all major Jewish organizations and synagogues in Greater New
Orleans. It is committed to having abortion be a safe and
legal procedure, free of government interference, for all
women consistent with their otwm private religious beliefs.
LOUISIANA CHOICE, NEW ORLEANS CHAPTER is committed to
working with electoral and legislative processes to ensure a
woman's right to safe and legal abortion Because the
Louisiana legislature has refused to protect women lives and
well-being, LOUISIANA CHOICE joins the other amici in request-
ing this court to overturn the Louisiana criminal abortion
statute.
THE LOUISIANA NATIONAL ORGANIZATION FOR WOMEN is the
state affiliate of the National Organization for Women, an
organization of over 250,000 members committed to taking
action to secure equal rights for women, including the right
to safe and accessible birth control and abortion. It joins
this brief, because it believes that Louisiana's abortion law
violates the equal rights of women.
THE LOUISIANA PSYCHIATRIC ASSOCIATION, whose membership
consists of over 450 psychiatrists, affirms its position that
abortion is a medical procedure and that the early termination
of pregnancy is a matter to be decided by the patient and the
physician. Because of the potentially adverse emotional
consequences of unwanted pregnancy on families and society,
the Louisiana Psychiatric Association opposes all constitu-
tional amendments, legislation, and regulations curtailing
family planning and abortion services to any segment of the
population.
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INTEREST OF THE MNICUS CURIAE (CONT.)
THE NATIONAL COUNCIL OF JEWISH WOMEN, GREATER NEW ORLEANS
CHAPTER, is a community service organization committed to the
advancement of human welfare through the activities of
volunteers engaged in a multifaceted coordinated program of
education, advocacy and services. It joins this brief in an
effort to protect the welfare of the women of Louisiana,
consistent with their own religious values.
THE NEW JERSEY WOMEN LAWYERS ASSOCIATION ["NJWLA"] is a
non-profit bar association formed for the purpose of identify-
ing issues of concern to women attorneys, and to study and
advise the public and its membership on issues affecting the
legal status of women. As such, the attention of the NJWLA
membership has been called to the issue before the Court,
namely Louisiana's criminal abortion statute and its negative
impact on the legal status of women. The NJWLA therefore
joins in the brief of amicus curiae in support of equality for
women.
THE WOMEN OF COLOR REPRODUCTIVE HEALTH FORUM is spon-
sored by the Council on the Concerns of Women Physicians of
the National Medical Association. The National Medical
Association represents approximately sixteen thousand African-
American Physicians nationwide. A major goal of the Women's
Council is to improve the health status of African-American
women, particularly the underserved and underrepresented.
The state of Louisiana has been chosen as one of the
states of focus for the project given the poor reproductive
health indices in the areas of teenage pregnancy, cancer,
sexually transmitted diseases, and infant mortality. The
REPRODUCTIVE HEALTH FORUM Project's task is to increase the
quantity and quality of reproductive health care services to
African-American women, and to empower African-American women
to adopt more preventive health behaviors.
The new abortion law negatively impacts the major goal of
the projects as it worsens the health status of African-
American women. Prior to Roe v. Wade, 70% of all abortion-
related deaths were African-American women. Whenever repro-
ductive rights are abrogated, women of color die first, and
disproportionately. We join the other amici in urging this
court to strike down the discriminatory anti-abortion legisla-
tion in issue.
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The Act, which criminalizes abortion and contraception,
discriminates against women. It therefore violates the equal
protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, as well as the
right to privacy. This brief focuses on the equality issues.
The Act would cause a devastating, disparate impact 2n=y
against women. It would shorten women's lives, harm their
reproductive capacities, as well as sharply reduce their
standard of living. Although the Louisiana legislature was
made aware of this impact, it consistently refused to pass any
amendments to the Act that would lessen this impact.
Appellants cannot justify this impact against women,
because the means chosen do not substantially serve the
state's purported objective of protecting life. Virtually no
other geographical unit in the western world has passed such
a restrictive measure in the twentieth century. Louisiana has
unconstitutionally disregarded the value of women's lives in
its radical attempt to protect embryonic life from the moment
of conception.
The Act reflects an out-moded view of women as compulsory
bearers and caretakers of children that is drawn from Louisi-
ana's nineteenth century civil law tradition. The equal
protection clause requires Louisiana to move its civil law
tradition into the twentieth century by respecting the lives
and well-being of women.
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I. THE ACT DISCRIMINATES AGAINTST tOM
A. INTRODUCTION
In the complaint filed in this case, plaintiffs alleged
that the Act, which criminalizes abortion and many forms of
contraception, discriminates against them as women. The Act
violates their sex-based equal protection rights as guaranteed
by the Fourteenth Amendment, because it:
imposes burdens upon women's reproductive choices
and bodily integrity that are not imposed upon the
reproductive choices of men, contributes to nega-
tive stereotypes about women, and prevents women
from becoming full and equal participants in soci-
ety. (Amended Complaint 1 118)
Because the district court decided the case on the basis
of plaintiffs' privacy claim, it did not reach the equal
protection claim. The court stated: "I recognize that if the
Supreme Court overrules Roe v. Wade, one or more of these
issues may have to be considered on remand." (opinion, p. 4)
Appellants Roemer and Guste have not challenged that conclu-
sion by the district court. (Brief of Appellants at 3 n.1.)
The Supreme Court has never considered the applicability
of sex-based equal protection doctrine to an abortion and
contraception case, because it has decided those cases on
privacy grounds. Although the parties represented by this
brief agree with appellees that the Act violates the right to
privacy, they believe that the Act also violates the equal
[Vol. 43.HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL
protection clause. Thus, this Court should instruct the lower
court, in the event of a remand, to conclude that the Act
discriminates against the plaintiffs as women, because it
violates the Fourteenth Amendment.
When a plaintiff challenges a measure on the ground that
it constitutes gender discrimination, the Court first deter-
mines whether the plaintiff has established a prima facie case
of gender discrimination. To establish a prima facie case,
the plaintiff can establish that the legislature created a per
se gender-based classification. See. e.c., Mississippi
Uniyersity for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718 (1982). Alterna-
tively, the plaintiff can establish that the legislature
intentionally created a gender-based disparate impact. see.
e.g., Personnel Administrator v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256 (1979).
In the present case, plaintiffs can establish a prima
facie case of gender discrimination under either method of
proof. The Act constitutes a per se gender-based classifica-
tion, because it classifies on the basis of a trait --
pregnancy -- that, as a matter of biology, only women possess.
Alternatively, the plaintiffs can demonstrate that the
legislature intentionally harmed women by passing the Act,
because the legislature knowingly created the maximum impact
against women while regulating abortion and contraception.
If the plaintiffs can meet the intentional standard for
disparate impact then they have necessarily met the per se
standard. Accordingly, this brief will focus on the impact-
THE LOUISIANA ABORTION CASEApril 1992]
intent standard while recognizing that the more lenient per so
standard is also available in the present case.'
B. The Act Produces Disparato Xpact Egainat tomon
A gender-based impact occurs in a pregnancy-related case
when the government's policy burdens women rather than simply
fails to benefit them. Thus, in Nashville Gas Co. y. Satt,
434 U.S. 136 (1977), the Court was able to conclude that the
plaintiffs established a disparate impact, because the
employment policy substantially burdened women's reproductive
lives.2 As then-Justice Rehnquist stated for the Court in
Satty, a gender-based impact is established when the govern-
ment "has not merely refused to extend to women a benefit that
men cannot and do not receive, but has imposed on women a
substantial burden that men need not suffer."2 Id. at 142.
The Act, criminalizing abortion and many forms of
'To the extent that Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484,
496-97 n.20 (1974) can be interpreted as rejecting the per se
standard, it was wrongly decided and has been sharply criti-
cized. See generally Law, Rethinking Sex and the constitu-
tion, 132 U. Pa. L. Rev. 955, 984 nn. 107-09 (1984) (citing
dozens of articles criticizing Geduldig). Reproductive issues
are basic to women's well-being in society. Congress recog-
nized this fact when it amended Title VII of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. S2000e et sg., (1991) to state
explicitly that pregnancy-based discrimination constitutes se::
discrimination. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k)(1991). This Court
should defer to Congress' interpretation of sex-based equali-
ty, because section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment explicitly
gives Congress the power to enforce the Fourteenth Amendment.
2Although Sattv involved an alleged violation of Title
VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. S 2000e et
sea., (1991) rather than the Constitution, the Court used the
same analysis to determine whether a gender-based impact had
been established as it would have in a constitutional case.
4
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contraception, produces a devastating, disparate impact
against women. Women are the only group that will be substan-
tially impacted by the Act. The purpose of the Act is to
preclude the women of Louisiana from being able to terminate
a pregnancy from the moment of conception. The statute
intends to coerce nearly 17,000 women, who otherwise would
choose to terminate their pregnancies through lawful and safe
abortions, to undergo compulsory childbirth, self-induce an
abortion, or seek an illegal abortion. Each of these alterna-
tives would be very detrimental to the lives and well-being of
the women in the state of Louisiana. In addition, the effect
of the statute will be to ban many forms of contraception;
each of the banned contraceptives are ones presently available
to women, not men. More importantly, it is women, not men,
who will face the burden of compulsory pregnancy that is the
result of banning contraceptives.
3
In Webster v. Reproductive Health Services, 492 U.S. 490
(1989), Chief Justice Rehnquist recognized that abortion
regulations can have a dramatic negative impact on women's
lives. Yet, he predicted that states would never again impose
nearly absolute abortion restrictions on women:
3Although amici agree with Appellees that the Act
unconstitutionally bans many forms of contraception, this
brief will focus on the impact to women of banning nearly all
abortions. As this brief will demonstrate, banning abortion
coerces many women to undergo compulsory childbirth, seek
illegal abortions, or self-induce abortions with serious
negative consequences. By also banning many forms of contra-
ception, the Act greatly magnifies the impact on women.
5
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The dissent's suggestion ... that legislative bodies, in
a Nation where more than half of our population is women,
will treat our decision today as an invitation to enact
abortion regulations reminiscent of the dark ages not
only misreads our views but does scant justice to those
who serve in such bodies and the people who elect them.
Id. at 521.
Despite Chief Justice Rehnquist's prediction, the
Louisiana legislature has responded to Webster by re-enacting
its nineteenth century abortion statute. The nineteenth
century is the dark ages for the women of Louisiana. Because
the legislative process has consistently failed to protect the
women of Louisiana, judicial intervention is needed to protect
them. In particular, the women who are least well represented
by the political process and who will be most impacted by the
statute -- adolescent females, women with handicaps, and poor
and minority women -- need to be protected.
1. Adolescent Females
The Act would disproportionately coerce pregnant adoles-
cent females to undergo compulsory childbirth, self-induce an
abortion or seek an illegal abortion, because they are
unlikely to have the economic resources and knowledge to
travel out of state to obtain a legal abortion. These results
would effect large numbers of females, because, at present,
females aged 18-19 year old have the highest rate of abortions
of any age group. See Henshaw et al., A Portrait of American
Women Who Obtain Abortions, 17 Family Planning Perspectives 90
(1985).
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Studies have found that illegal abortion, rather than
childbirth, is the most likely result in countries in which
safe or legal abortions are not available. See Mashalaba,
Commentary on the causes and conseauences of unwanted preg-
nancy from an African Perspective, 3 Int. J. Gynecol. Obstet.
15, 17 (1989). The negative health consequences of illegal
abortions would be dramatic for pregnant adolescents. "Com-
plications include hemorrhage, puerperal infection, and
abdominal perforations, which can lead to death, chronic
morbidity, or secondary infertility." IL.
For those pregnant adolescent females who "choose"
compulsory childbirth over illegal abortion, the negative
health consequences would also be dramatic. They would be at
an increased risk of developing gallstones, see Buiumsohn et
al., Cholelithiasis and Teenage Mothers, 11 J. of Adolescent
Health Care 339 (1990); of suffering the effects of an ectopic
pregnancy, see Gale et al., Tubal Preanancv in Adolescents, 11
J. of Adolescent Health Care 485 (1990); and of aggravating
common pre-existing conditions such as asthma, see Apter et
al., Outcomes of Pregnancy in Adolescents with Severe Asthma,
149 Archives of Internal Medicine 2571 (1989). Pregnant
adolescents are also at a disproportionate risk of dying from
a hemorrhage or miscarriage, and have a relatively high
maternal morbidity and mortality rate. See Barnett, Factors
that Adversely Affect the Health and Well-Being of African-
American Adolescent Mothers and their Infants in Teenage
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Pregnancy: Developing Strategies for Change in the Twenty-
First Century 101, 105 (eds. Jones and Battle 1990). The risk
of health problems and medical complications are even higher
for African-American adolescents. X. at 106.
The long-term negative consequences of adolescent
childbearing for young women include reduced educational
attainment, lower earnings, increased risk of welfare depen-
dency, greater marital instability, a more rapid pace of
childbearing, and lower perceived personal efficacy. Spe
Brazzell & Acock, Influence of Attitudes. Significant Others
and Aspirations on How Adolescents Intend to Resolve a
Premarital Pregnancy, 50 J. of Marriage & Family 413 (1988).
Female adolescents, themselves, are minors who do not
have the right to vote. The Louisiana legislature has
sacrificed their lives for the lives of embryos from the
moment of conception.
2. Women with Handicaps
Coerced childbirth would substantially harm the health of
many women with handicaps. Therapeutic abortions are routine-
ly recommended for women with congestive heart failure,
cyanotic congenital heart disease, primary or secondary
hypertension, renal failure, kidney disease, or Eisenmenger
Syndrome, because these conditions threaten a pregnant woman's
health. See Elkayam & Gleicher, Cardiac Problemsin-Pregnan-
cv, 25 JAMA 2838 (1989). Similarly, therapeutic abortions are
generally recommended for pregnant women with breast cancer in
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Stage IV or V, so that they can receive the necessary treat-
ment. See Onion, Breast Cancer with Precnancy, 84 Amer. J. of
Nursing 11-26 (1984).
Coerced childbirth would also worsen the medical condi-
tion of pregnant HIV-positive women, because it would depress
cell-mediated immunity, and thereby cause more rapid progres-
sion of HIV infection. See Koonin et al., Pregnancy-Associat-
ed Deaths Due to AIDS in the United States, 258 JAMA 2714-17
(1987). Women in the later stages of HIV infection are more
likely to experience severe pregnancy complications such as
breech presentation or their own death. See Selwyn et al.,
Prospective Study of HIV Infection and Pregnancy Outcomes in
Intravenous Drug Use, 261 JAMA 1289-94 (1989). Thus, the
Centers for Disease Control recommends that HIV-infected women
not become pregnant. See Grimes, The CDC and Abortion in HIV-
Positive Women, 259 JAMA 1176 (1987).
Finally, pregnant women with pre-existing major psychiat-
ric illness would not be able to receive adequate medical care
if abortion were criminalized:
Psychiatrists are confronted with patients who have
suffered major postpartum psychiatric decompensa-
tions after previous deliveries and who, at serious
risk of recurrence, consult them for advice. Other
patients suffer from chronic psychiatric diseases
that make them unable to care for children....
The administration of psychotropic medication is
another complicating clinical issue. Psychiatrists
may, in emergency situations, prescribe agents with
unknown or adverse effects on embryonic development
before a patient's pregnancy can be diagnosed.
Stotland, Psychiatric Issues in Abortion, and the Implications
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of Recent Legal Chanaes for Psychiatric Practice in Psychiat-
ric Aspects of Abortion 1,13 (Stotland ed. 1991)
4
Like adolescents, women with handicaps are a group that
is poorly represented by the political process and needs
protection from the courts to avoid being sacrificed for the
lives of embryos from the moment of conception.
3. Poor and Minority Women
The Act would have a dramatic, negative impact on the
lives of poor and minority women. At present, the highest
legal abortion rate is among unmarried women under 30 who are
nonwhite, nonHispanic, and who have a family income under
$11,000 per year. See Goldsmith, ResearchersAmass Abortion
Data, 262 JAMA 1431 (1989). Few abortion-related deaths
presently occur. By contrast women of color accounted for 645s
of the deaths associated with illegal abortions in this
country in 1972. See Cates & Rochat, IlleqIl Abortions in the
United States: 1972-1974, 8 Fam. Plan. Persp. 86,87 (1976).
Mishandled criminal abortions were the principal cause of
maternal deaths in the 1960's. See Nisuander, Medical
Abortion Practices in the United States, in Abortion and the
Law 53 (Smith ed. 1967). The mortality rates for African-
American women were nine times higher than for white women.
See Gold, Therapeutic Abortions in New York: A 20 Year Review,
'The Louisiana legislature was made aware of these
adverse effects on women with preexisting mental illness
through the testimony of Dr. Helen Ullrich. See Testimony by
Dr. Ullrich before Louisiana Senate Committee on Health and
Welfare 38-39 (May 29, 1991).
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55 Am. J. Pub. Health 964-65 (1965).
Poor and minority women, like female adolescents and
women with handicaps, have been consistently ignored by the
Louisiana legislature. This Court should not tolerate the
callous indifference to their lives reflected by the Act.
C. The Louisiana Legislature Knowingly Caused Harm to
Women in Passing the Act
Because the Act would have a dramatic gender-based impact
on women's lives and well-being, this Court should conclude
that this impact violates the Constitution so long as the
adverse effects reflect an "invidious" purpose. Personnel
Administrator v. Feeney, 442. U.S. 256, 274 (1979). As the
Supreme Court said in Feeney, the "dispositive question, then,
is whether the appellee has shown that a gender-based discrim-
inatory purpose has, at least in some measure, shaped the
[legislation]." Id. at 276.
Although the Supreme Court in Fe did not find that
the plaintiffs established a record of purposeful discrimi-
nation,5 such evidence is readily available in the present
case. The Louisiana legislature, unlike the legislature in
sIn Feeney, the Massachusetts legislature originally
passed the veteran's-preference statute when men and women did
not routinely compete for the same jobs. Id. at 255 n.14
(noting the standard practice of having jobs listed on a
gendered basis until 1971). The legislature therefore
conceived of its intent as assisting one group of men,
veterans, over another group of men, nonveterans. Thus, the
Court was not able to conclude from the facts in Feeney that
the legislature consciously harmed women when it originally
enacted the veterans preference statute.
11
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Feeney, was repeatedly informed of the impact of this Act on
women in the state of Louisiana at the time of its enactment.
Yet, time and time again, the state refused to modify its
absolute abortion ban to minimize the impact on women. It
soundly rejected an amendment to provide an exception when a
woman's health was endangered by her pregnancy, see Addendum
A-1 (amendment rejected by a vote of 8-30); rejected an
exception for women with AIDS, see Addendum A-2 (amendment
rejected by a vote of 12-26); and rejected an amendment to
increase welfare benefits to pregnant women, see Addendum A-3
(amendment tabled by a vote of 23-14). No justification
except for an indifference to the lives and well-being of
women could explain such actions. The state knowingly
imprisoned these women to compulsory childbirth while shorten-
ing their lives.
II. Appellants Cannot Constitutionally Uustify Thoir
Discrimination Against Women
A. Introduction
If the plaintiff establishes a prima facie case of
gender-based discrimination then the statute is unconstitu-
tional unless the defendants can meet their burden of justifi-
cation. The Supreme Court has held that the defendants must
"carry the burden of showing an 'exceedingly persuasive
justification"' in a gender-based equality case. Mississippi
University for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. at 724 (quoting
Kirchbera v, Feenstra, 450 U.S. 455, 461 (1981)). In as-
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sessing the stated justifications, the Court undertakes a
"searching analysis", Id. at 728, of whether the restriction
is, in fact, "substantially related to the statutory objec-
tive." Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976). That
statutory objective must be "important." Id.
Exacting as it is, this scrutiny escalates to the highest
level where, as here, legislation that discriminates on the
basis of gender also intrudes on bodily integrity, procre-
ation, health, family, and life itself. See, e.g., Skinner v.
Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942) (applying strict scrutiny under
the equal protection clause to a compulsory sterilization
law); Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374 (1978) (applying
strict scrutiny under the equal protection clause to a
marriage restriction that discriminated against persons with
outstanding child support obligations). See also Thornburgh
v. American College of Obstetricians & Gynecologists, 476 U.S.
747, 772 (1986)(recognizing importance of extending "private
sphere of individual liberty" to "women as well as to men.")
Because plaintiffs can prevail in the present case under the
more lenient intermediate scrutiny, this brief will argue
under that standard.
B. The Act is Not Substantially Related to Its Purport-
ed Objective of Protecting Life
If the state's objective were to protect life, then that
objective would meet the requirement of being an "important
state interest." However, the state did not have a genuine
April 1992]
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interest in protecting the lives of children or women.
Instead, it was trying to coerce women to return to their
nineteenth century exclusive roles of childbearer and caretak-
er of children.
Louisiana ranks nearly last in the United States in
regard to the health and well-being of its children -- a
situation that would be greatly exacerbated if the Act would
go into effect. Senator Cleo Fields understood this problem
and tried to persuade the legislature to modify the Act so
that it would be able to better serve the women and children
of Louisiana. He informed the legislature that Louisiana's
infant mortality rate was 11.9% in 1987, one of the highest in
the United States; that 8.7% of all babies that were born were
low birth weight as compare to 6.9% nationally; and that 36%
of Louisiana women received late prenatal care or no prenatal
care at all, a condition that leads to high infant mortality
and low birth weight. See Statement of Senator Fields before
Louisiana Senate Committee on Health and Welfare at 49 (May
29, 1991).
Based on this testimony, Senator Fields was able to
convince the Senate Committee on Health and Welfare to amend
the Act so as to allow it to go into effect only when Medicaid
eligibility for pregnant women and children was expanded. The
Senate, however, stripped the bill of that amendment. See
Official Journal of the Senate of the State of Louisiana 48-49
(June 3, 1991) (tabled by a vote of 34-14). See also Addendum
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A-3 (language of rejected amendment). Senator Field tried to
reintroduce the amendment on June 4, 1991, when it was again
tabled by a vote of 23-15. See Official Journal of the Senate
of the State of Louisiana 14-15 (June 4, 1991).
6
The Louisiana legislature was willing to shift the burden
of compulsory childbirth on to women, as well as the enormous
expenses of childrearing, but it was not willing to do
anything meaningful to assist the children who would be born
or to relieve women of childcare responsibilities. Those
means are not pro-child or pro-life.7 When stripped of their
rhetoric, they are means designed to coerce women into
resuming their traditional role of motherhood.
The irrationality and ineffectiveness of the Act becomes
more apparent when one compares it to legislation passed
elsewhere. Other states and other countries have sought to
protect life, yet virtually no other jurisdiction in the
western world has considered it necessary or appropriate to
pass such a stringent anti-abortion measure in this century.
61n addition, the legislature refused to improve the
state's regulation of day care centers so that children could
receive adequate day care and mothers could avoid some
childcare responsibilities while maintaining employment or
education. See La. H.B. 15 (1991) and La. S.B. 3 (1991). See
also Day-care bill dealt a blow in the House, The Times-
Picayune 1, col. 5 (August 1, 1991).
7The legislature also rejected an amendment that would
have eliminated capital punishment in the state. See Official
Journal of the Senate of the State of Louisiana 15 (June 4,
1991). (Tabled by a vote of 29-8). See also Appendix A-4
(language of amendment).
April 1992] THE LOUISIANA ABORTION CASE
HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL
Within the United States, even before Roe V. Wade was
decided, states were moving in the direction of liberalizing
their abortion laws and breaking with the nineteenth century
tradition of restrictive abortion laws. These more liberal
laws contained numerous abortion exceptions and reflected an
increasing respect for women's well-being.8  See Doe V.
Bolton, 410 U.S. 179, 182-83 (1973).1 Louisiana, however, has
never been willing to consider the importance of women's lives
when regulating abortion.
Since Webster was decided, the overwhelming majority of
states have not restricted abortion at all. Of the few states
that have passed measures restricting abortion, they have
created numerous exceptions.10 If the means chosen under the
Louisiana Act were closely tailored, then one must inquire why
no other state in the last century has considered it necessary
8Amici do not suggest that these laws were constitution-
al. Nevertheless, they reflected more consideration of
women's well-being than Louisiana's virtually complete ban on
abortion.
9The statute considered in Roe was not passed in the
twentieth century. Like the Louisiana statute, it represents
a nineteenth century understanding of women's role in society.
10he most restrictive post-Webster measure passed by a
state has been the Utah statute which provides for an abortion
exception in the event of rape or incest, grave damage to the
woman's health, or grave fetal defects. Utah Code Ann. @ 76-
7-302(2)(1991). Guam, which is a territory subject to the
United States Constitution, has passed an abortion measure
that is less restrictive than Louisiana's, See 9 Guam Code
Ann. S 31.20 (1991). Amici do not suggest that these statutes
are constitutional. Nevertheless, they reflect more respect
for women's well-being than the Louisiana statute.
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or appropriate to enact such a stringent measure even before
Roe v. Wade was decided.
Although the appellants claim that the purpose of the Act
is to protect the unborn child, it is not codified as part of
Louisiana's Crimes Against Persons statutes. Instead, it is
a part of the code that deals with public morality -- the part
of the code that has historically restricted both abortion and
contraception. As such, it reflects an attempt to resurrect
nineteenth century views on public morality and women's place
in society rather than a genuine concern for the person.
C. The Act is Based on Out-Moded and Stereotypical
Views of Women
Appellants argue that their absolute prohibition of
abortion stems from their civil law tradition. Brief of
Appellant Connick at 25-28. That civil law tradition,
however, is unconstitutionally based on out-moded and stereo-
typical views of women.
Under the Civil Codes of 1808, 1825, and 1870, women
could not exercise political rights, vote or hold any elective
office. In addition, they could not exercise any civil
function unless specifically capacitated. See Saunders,
Lectures on the Civil Code of Louisiana 14 (1925). Married
women had little capacity to act without the authority of
their husbands. IZ. at 33. It was not until 1979, under
judicial mandate, that Louisiana drafted an equal management
act to eliminate the "head and master" rule. See 1978 La.
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Acts No. 627, repealed by 1979 La. Acts No. 709 § 5 replaced
by 1979 La. Acts Nos. 709, 710, 711. See also Kirchberg v.
Feenstra, 450 U.S. 455 (1981) (finding Louisiana's "head and
master" rule to be unconstitutional).
Most of western Europe shares this same civil law
tradition. Yet, Europe has managed to adapt that tradition to
the twentieth century by respecting women's well-being along
with fetal well-being. See Cook, Abortion laws and policies:
challenges and opportunities, 3 Int. J. Gynecol. Obstet. 61,
62-65 (1989). France, Louisiana's civil law ancestor, has a
much less restrictive abortion law than Louisiana." In
addition, France has been the world leader in providing
publicly funded abortion and contraception through the
development of RU 486.
One obvious indication of the Louisiana legislature's
stereotypical views of women reflected in the Act is its
exemption of women who self-induce abortions from the
statute's coverage. La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 14:87(A) (2) (1991).
No justification consistent with the statute's purported
objective can explain this exception. Self-induced abortions
"French law permits a woman to choose an abortion without
restriction in the first ten weeks of her pregnancy; after ten
weeks, an abortion is permitted when the pregnancy would
seriously endanger a pregnant woman's health or the fetus is
suffering from a particularly serious disease or condition.
See 26 Intl Digest of Health Leg. 351-54 (1975). At no time
during her pregnancy, does a woman in France need to demon-
strate that her life was threatened by the continuation of her
pregnancy in order to obtain an abortion.
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are likely to destroy both women and fetus' lives. On the
other hand, such an exception supports a nineteenth century
"pedestal" view of women by leaving them free from the
criminal law.
Louisiana's traditional ideology that supports the Act is
reflective of the ideology that has been found elsewhere to
support abortion restrictions. Support for laws banning
abortions have been found to be an outgrowth of stereotypical
notions that women's only appropriate roles are those of
mother and housewife; in many cases, such laws have emerged as
a direct reaction to the increasing number of women who work
outside the home. See generallv Luker, Abortion and the
Politics of Motherhood 192-215 (1984).
Louisiana cannot hide behind its civil law tradition to
remain in the dark ages. The equal protection clause requires
it to move its civil law tradition into a twentieth century
understanding of women's rights and well-being.
The women of Louisiana would prefer to be represented by
their legislature rather than turn to the courts for protec-
tion. Woman after woman testified before the Louisiana
legislature about the dramatic negative consequences that
would follow if the Act were enacted. Unfortunately, their
efforts did not result in the legislature approving one
meaningful exception to the Act. Until the women of Louisiana
can gain access to the responsible state legislature that
Chief Justice Rehnquist described in Webster, they will have
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to seek protection from the courts.
I1. Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, Amicus Curiae Supporting
Appellees urge this Court to affirm the district court.
Alternatively, this Court should instruct the district court,
in the event of a remand, that the Act violates the equal
protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Respectfully submitted,
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ADDENDUM: TEXT OF SELECTED REJECTED AMENDMENTS
Physical or Mental Health Exception
The physician terminates a pregnancy when the
physical or mental health of the mother is serious-
ly threatened by the pregnancy and prior to such
termination, the physician prepares a report, and
obtains the written concurrence of another physi-
cian, stating each reason which warrants the termi-
nation of the pregnancy.
Official Journal of the Senate of the State of Louisiana 19
(June 4, 1991)(rejected by a vote of 8-30).
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ADDENDUM (CONT.)
HIV Exception
The physician terminates a pregnancy when the
mother has tested positive for the presence of the
human immunodeficiency virus (HIV), which result
has been confirmed by the second test, with each
test being conducted by a laboratory approved by
the Department of Health and Hospitals for such
purposes, and prior to such termination, the physi-
cian prepares a report stating the reason which
warrants the termination of the pregnancy.
Official Journal of the Senate of the State of Louisiana 14
(June 4, 1991) (rejected by a vote of 12-26).
ADDENDUM (CONT.)
Amendment to Increase Medicaid Eligibility
A. Upon receipt of the necessary waivers from the
appropriate federal agency, which the secretary of
the Department of Health and Hospitals shall re-
quest, the department shall amend the Medicaid
state law to provide for:
(1) Eligibility for Medicaid services for all
pregnant women with an income up to one hundred
eighty-five percent of the federal poverty income
guidelines.
(2) Medicaid eligibility for any pregnant woman who
qualifies based on preliminary financial informa-
tion indicating that her income and resources fall
within the eligibility criteria and guarantee of
payment for her services.
(3) Eligibility criteria for Medicaid services for
pregnant adolescents based on the income of the
pregnant adolescent and not on the income of her
parents.
(4) A program of care coordination for all eligible
pregnant women ....
B. In accordance with the Administrative Procedure
Act, the department shall promulgate regulations
requiring that all public health programs which
render prenatal care services shall provide, at a
minimum, for the following:
(1) Expanded or flex-time hours of operation so
that health care services are available to pregnant
women during evening and weekend hours.
(2) An initial appointment within two weeks of
request and minimal waiting time to receive servic-
es after entering a health care facility.
(3) Procedures to assure that pregnant women are
receiving and continue to receive prenatal servic-
es.
Sections 2,3,5, and 6 of this Act shall become
effective only if, as, and when the program provid-
ed in Section 4 of this Act is funded and imple-
mented and in such event shall become effective on
the first day of the calendar month after the
department certifies to the governor and the legis-
lature that the program is implemented.
Official Journal of the Senate of the State of Louisiana 48-49
(June 3, 1991)(tabled by a vote of 23-14).
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PDDENDUK (CONT.)
Capital Punishment Amendment
to remove the imposition of capital punishment for
the commission of any criminal offense
Official Journal of the Senate of the State of Louisiana 15
(June 4, 1991)(tabled by a vote of 29-8).
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United States Court of Appeals
For The Fifth Circuit
Sojourner T. et al.,
Plaintiffs-Appellees,
-- versus --
Buddy Roemer et al.,
Defendants-Appellants,
No. 91-3677
On Appeal From The United States District Court
For The Eastern District of Louisiana
Motion for Leave to File Amicus Curiae Brief In
Support of Plaintiffs-Appellees on Behalf of Black
Women For Choice; The Community Relations Commit-
tee, Jewish Federation of Greater New Orleans;
Louisiana Choice; Louisiana Psychiatric Associa-
tion; Louisiana National Organization for Women;
The New Jersey Women Lawyers Association; and the
Women of Color Reproductive Health Forum
Black Women for Choice, et al., are organizations that
will be substantially affected if Act 26 of the 1991 Louisiana
Legislature ("the Act"], criminalizing abortion and many forms
of contraception, is allowed to go into effect. They move
this court for leave to file an amicus curiae brief in support
of plaintiffs-appellees which focuses on how the Act violates
women's equality rights. In support thereof, amici state as
follows:
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(1) The groups participating in the amicus brief
represent women of color, poor women, adolescent females,
women with mental and physical handicaps, as well as other
women inside and outside the state who will be substantially
affected if the Act is found to be constitutional.
(2) Each of the groups participating in the anicus brief
are committed to women's equality, and believes that women's
equality will be undermined if the Act is found to be consti-
tutional.
(3) The equality basis for overturning the Act was
raised in the plaintiffs' complaint in the present case but
has not been fully briefed to this Court in any of the briefs
filed in this case.
(4) Because the equality issue is central to an under-
standing of the constitutionality of the Act, amicus curiae
respectfully request permission to file their brief on the
equality issue.
(5) The brief of amici curiae, which is attached to this
motion, has been filed within fifteen (15) days of the filing
of plaintiffs-appellees' brief, as required by Local Rule 29.
HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 43
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CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, amici curiae respectfully
request this Court to grant their motion for leave to file
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Appendix B
Text of October 18, 1991 letter from Ruth Colker to Jeff Campbell, Direc-
tor, New Orleans AIDS (NO/AIDS) Task Force.
Dear Jeff:
I wanted to take a few minutes to communicate my disappointment
to you and your Board over the resolution of your organization's partici-
pation in the amicus brief in Sojourner T v. Buddy Roemer (the Louisi-
ana abortion case).
When I initially sought your organization's participation, I under-
stood that your Board might vote not to participate. Although I would
have been disappointed, I would have respected that decision given the
difficult nature of the abortion issue. The way the issue ended up being
ultimately resolved, however, disappointed me much more. I would
therefore like to share that disappointment.
I deliberately wrote the brief as a "moderate" abortion brief. It
takes no position on the issue of what would be a constitutional abortion
statute, except to argue that the absence of a "health" exception defi-
nitely makes the statute unconstitutional. I therefore focused on the
health implications to various subgroups of women-adolescent females,
women with physical and mental handicaps, and poor and minority wo-
men. Within the category of women with physical and mental handi-
caps, I focused, in particular, on women with HIV infection. The health
implications that I discussed for each subgroup were quite dramatic-
shortened life expectancy and serious infringement on health. Those ef-
fects were no more or less dramatic for women with HIV infection than
for the other subgroups of women described in the brief. A shortened life
is a shortened life.
When I circulated the brief to other community groups, they usually
responded by giving me more examples of these health implications for
their community, e.g., kidney and renal failure or complicating effects of
drugs used to treat psychiatric illness. These comments were very help-
ful to me in revising the brief since, as a lawyer, it is hard for me to keep
abreast of all medical issues relating to pregnancy.
The response by the NO/AIDS Task Force, however, is markedly
different. Rather than suggesting how I could have better or more accu-
rately discussed the implications of the abortion statute on women with
HIV infection, the Task Force chose to limit its endorsement of the brief
to the particular paragraphs referencing women with HIV infection. As
I told you over the telephone, that limitation was not acceptable, because
of the negative implications that it cast on my other clients-suggesting
April 1992] THE LOUISIANA ABORTION CASE
HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL
that their health problems were not obviously as dramatic and therefore
deserving of the court's and legislature's attention.
The reason that I find the Task Force's response so unsettling is that
it was actually being asked to do very little-simply agree that the health
of women with HIV infection is implicated by compulsory pregnancy in
a way that is comparable to that of other women. Nevertheless, it was
not willing to stand beside its sisters in that way.
I have heard two comments recently which underscore the unac-
ceptability of the Task Force's actions. First, on a T.V. show concerning
gay and lesbian rights, a member of the audience had commented that
"homosexuals" were immoral and that God had therefore responded to
their immorality with the AIDS epidemic. A lesbian on the show re-
sponded that then God must much favor lesbians since (ignoring the
CDC's [Center for Disease Control's] absurd definition of lesbianism),
lesbians had a very low incidence of AIDS. The member of the audience
responded by saying that he had not intended to direct his comment
against lesbians; it would be fine if we shipped only gay men off to con-
centration camps. The lesbian then responded that, no, if gay men were
sent away, she would insist upon going with them. In the present con-
text, this response does not seem to have been reciprocated. So long as
women with HIV infection are not harmed by the state's abortion stat-
ute, the Task Force is seemingly willing to permit other women's health
to be harmed by the statute.
Second, Sandy Lowe, staff attorney for the Lambda Legal Defense
Fund, recently spoke at Tulane Law School. In a passing reference, she
asked how the gay male community would have responded if it were
lesbians, not gay men, who were first inflicted with the AIDS virus. The
response of your organization to participating in this brief makes me
shudder to consider what those consequences might have been.
As you know, even before women began to focus on the HIV impli-
cations on women, women have been very active in the AIDS movement.
If it were not for women's early participation in the AIDS movement, we
probably today would not have so much attention on the definition of
AIDS and how that negatively impacts women. Nor would we have so
much attention focused on the special problems of pregnant women with
AIDS. Women were willing to make the connection from their civil
rights concerns to that of AIDS in becoming involved in the movement
at an early stage. It is extremely disappointing to see the AIDS move-
ment (or a particular AIDS service organization) not willing, at all, to
make a reciprocal gesture.
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I understand that your organization is probably repeatedly re-
quested to align itself with other organizations and that, on some occa-
sions, those alignments may cause political and funding difficulties.
However, I wonder what it means when an organization becomes so
well-funded and acceptable politically that it turns its back on its sisters
who helped it gain that stature in the community. I will be watching the
NO/AIDS Task Force quite closely in the future to see whether I can
support it financially and politically. Success, in the case of the NO!
AIDS Task Force, seems to have had serious negative implications.
When the Sojourner T. case reaches the United States Supreme
Court, I plan to repeat my efforts at getting community groups to col-
laborate on a similar brief. I will be back in touch with you at that time
and hope that, by then, the Task Force has rediscussed this issue and
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